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A B S T R A C TThere is a signiﬁcant and growing interest among both payers and
producers of medical products for agreements that involve a “pay-for-
performance” or “risk-sharing” element. These payment schemes—
called “performance-based risk-sharing arrangements” (PBRSAs)—
involve a plan by which the performance of the product is tracked in
a deﬁned patient population over a speciﬁed period of time and the
amount or level of reimbursement is based on the health and cost
outcomes achieved. There has always been considerable uncertainty at
product launch about the ultimate real-world clinical and economic
performance of new products, but this appears to have increased in
recent years. PBRSAs represent one mechanism for reducing this
uncertainty through greater investment in evidence collection while
a technology is used within a health care system. The objective of this
Task Force report was to set out the standards that should be applied
to “good practices”—both research and operational—in the use of a
PBRSA, encompassing questions around the desirability, design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of such an arrangement. This report
provides practical recommendations for the development and appli-
cation of state-of-the-art methods to be used when considering, using,
or reviewing PBRSAs. Key ﬁndings and recommendations include the
following. Additional evidence collection is costly, and there are
numerous barriers to establishing viable and cost-effective PBRSAs:
negotiation, monitoring, and evaluation costs can be substantial. For
good research practice in PBRSAs, it is critical to match the appropriate
study and research design to the uncertainties being addressed. Goodsee front matter Copyright & 2013, International S
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u.washington.edu.
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lding, H375 1959 NE Paciﬁc Street, H-375A, Box 35governance processes are also essential. The information generated as
part of PBRSAs has public good aspects, bringing ethical and profes-
sional obligations, which need to be considered from a policy perspec-
tive. The societal desirability of a particular PBRSA is fundamentally an
issue as to whether the cost of additional data collection is justiﬁed by
the beneﬁts of improved resource allocation decisions afforded by the
additional evidence generated and the accompanying reduction in
uncertainty. The ex post evaluation of a PBRSA should, however, be a
multidimensional exercise that assesses many aspects, including not
only the impact on long-term cost-effectiveness and whether appro-
priate evidence was generated but also process indicators, such as
whether and how the evidence was used in coverage or reimburse-
ment decisions, whether budget and time were appropriate, and
whether the governance arrangements worked well. There is an
important gap in the literature of structured ex post evaluation of
PBRSAs. As an innovation in and of themselves, PBRSAs should also be
evaluated from a long-run societal perspective in terms of their impact
on dynamic efﬁciency (eliciting the optimal amount of innovation).
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Background to the Task Force
Since 2007, there has been an acceleration in interest in a
variety of arrangements between medical product manufac-
turers and payers that tie postlaunch data collection to
payments. The ISPOR Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Ar-
rangements Good Practices Task Force was approved by the
ISPOR Board of Directors in March 2011 to set out the standards
that should be applied to these arrangements, encompassing
the design, implementation, and evaluation of such agree-
ments. The report builds on previous work undertaken at Banff,
in the UK Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, and by
others as well as relevant work undertaken by other ISPOR Good
Research Practice Task Forces, notably those tackling issues
around the design, collection, and use of observational data to
improve the quality of decision making.
Professors Lou Garrison and Adrian Towse, task force co-
chairs, chose task force members on the basis of their knowl-
edge and experience in decision modeling, study design, market
access, coverage with evidence development, and performance-
based pricing arrangements. Members represented a diverse
range of practice and perspectives, including government
(Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco [AIFA]), academia, health eco-
nomic research and policy organizations, as well as the
pharmaceutical industry. The task force was international with
members from France, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The Task Force met approximately once a month by
teleconference to develop and revise the outline and draft, as
well as to discuss issues that arose in the process. A face-to-face
meeting was held in November 2011 to develop recommenda-
tions and to reach consensus on content issues. In addition, the
task force chairs had a series of one-on-one teleconferences to
revise sections of the manuscript. All task force members
reviewed and provided frequent feedback via oral or written
comments on the manuscript drafts.
Preliminary findings were presented in a forum at the 2011
ISPOR 14th Annual European Congress in Madrid, Spain.
Updated findings were presented at the Third Plenary Session
of the ISPOR 17th Annual International Meeting in June 2012 in
Washington, DC. In addition to the oral comments received
during the two presentations, a draft of this article was
distributed to the 100þ person ISPOR Performance-Based Risk-
Sharing Arrangements Task Force Review Group in January
2012. During the Review Group round of comments and the final
manuscript review sent to the entire ISPORmembership, several
hundred written comments were received from 104 ISPOR
members and organizations.
All comments, most of which were substantive and con-
structive, were considered. The comments were reviewed and
discussed by the task force in a series of teleconferences, and
addressed as appropriate in a revised manuscript. Once
consensus was reached by all authors, the final report was
submitted to Value in Health in April 2013.
All written comments, as well as the task force’s responses,
are published at the ISPOR Web site on the task force’s Web
page: http://www.ispor.org/Taskforces/performance-based-risk-
sharing-arrangements.asp The task force report and Web page
may also be accessed via the ISPOR homepage (www.ispor.org)
via the purple Research Tools menu, Good Practices for Out
comes Research. A list of reviewers is also available via the task
force’s Web page.
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There is a signiﬁcant and growing interest among payers and
producers of medical products for agreements that involve a
“pay-for-performance” or “risk-sharing” element. These payment
schemes—called “performance-based risk-sharing arrange-
ments” (PBRSAs)—involve a plan by which the performance of
the product is tracked in a deﬁned patient population over a
speciﬁed period of time and the level or continuation of reim-
bursement is based on the health and economic outcomes
achieved. One database study identiﬁed 116 cases of these types
of arrangements for medicines and other medical products since
1997 [1], with slowly growing numbers in the most recent years.
(See [2] and [3] for comprehensive lists of PBRSA examples.) This
broad trend across many developed countries represents, in part,
a response to the growing cost of new drugs and other innovative
medical products and the desire of payers to obtain greater
certainty and greater value for the money spent.
There has always been considerable uncertainty at product
launch about the ultimate real-world clinical and economic
performance of new medical products. The uncertainty and
concomitant ﬁnancial risk to the payer for a new treatment that
does not work as anticipated in the real world has increased
along with the rising price of the new treatments, whether a
biologic, device, or other medical technology. If payers are
reluctant to adopt, manufacturers face the risk of reduced
revenue for a product they regard as delivering value. PBRSAs
represent one mechanism for reducing uncertainty through
greater investment in evidence collection while a technology is
in use within a health care system.
Information about what works in medical care is, in eco-
nomic terminology, a public good—one person’s use of theinformation generally does not keep others from using it—
regardless of whether it is generated by public or private
entities. Public authorities who negotiate and fund evidence-
generating arrangements need to follow good research practi-
ces (GRPs) to improve the quality of the information derived and
to make the results of that research public where possible.
Private insurers, who may have less legal obligation for trans-
parency, can still beneﬁt from GRPs as they seek valid scientiﬁc
answers to the outcomes questions embedded in the arrange-
ments they negotiate. Encouraging them to put their ﬁndings in
the public domain can generate greater public beneﬁt as well, as
long as it does not inappropriately deter them from agreeing to
PBRSAs.
The objective of this Task Force report was to set out the
standards that should be applied to “good practices”—both
research and operational—in the use of a PBRSA, encompassing
questions around the desirability, design, implementation, and
evaluation of such an arrangement. This report provides practical
recommendations for the development and application of state-
of-the-art methods to be used when considering, using, or
reviewing PBRSAs.Deﬁning PBRSAs
PBRSAs fall under a variety of names and categories: outcomes-
based schemes, risk-sharing agreements, coverage with evidence
development (CED), access with evidence development, patient
access schemes (PASs), conditional licensing, and managed entry
schemes [2,4–10]. For the purposes of this discussion, we group
all these under the broad term “performance-based risk-sharing
arrangements” (PBRSAs).
Box 1–United Kingdom
Which entities are involved in the process?
The United Kingdom has “Patient Access Schemes”
(PASs) defined by the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation
Scheme (PPRS) of 2009. PASs are agreement-specific.
Most are, however, “financial” arrangements intended to
provide the UK National Health Service (NHS) with
effective discounts from list price rather than being
linked to health outcomes. The UK PASs include
performance-linked reimbursement agreements and
coverage with evidence development only with research
schemes, but are mainly types of discount agreements.
What is the general approach and experience in the
United Kingdom?
Examples of UK schemes include the following:
 The dose-capping agreement that the National In-
stitute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) entered
into over ranibizumab (Lucentis) for macular degen-
eration could be seen as an effective price discount or
a performance guarantee. Cost-effectiveness to NICE
was acceptable only if the NHS paid for up to 14
injections per eye of eligible patients. Novartis will
bear the costs of treatment beyond this [12].
 NICE recommended ustekinumab (Stelara) for severe
plaque psoriasis on the condition that Janssen-Cilag
ensures that the costs of treating patients weighing
more than 100 kg will be no more than those of
patients weighing less than 100 kg [13].
 The bortezomib (Velcade) agreement ensures the
identification of responders. There is retrospective
payer reimbursement for nonresponders. Responders
receive further doses of the product at the nor-
mal price.
 Pazopanib (Votrient) for advanced kidney cancer
involves a discount on the list price to achieve price
parity with sunitinib (Sutent). GSK agreed addition-
ally to give the NHS a financial rebate if pazopanib
proves inferior to sunitinib with regard to its efficacy,
in a head-to-head trial. The results of the COMPARZ
(COMParing the efficacy, sAfety and toleRability of
paZopanib vs. sunitinib) study were reported in
October 2012 and showed noninferiority in progres-
sion-free survival.
In total, there are 28 schemes as of March 2013, of
which 15 are simple discounts, 7 involve free stock, 2
involve dose capping, and 4 are more complex—these
include the bortezomib and pazopanib schemes [14].
Evidence on the costs and effects of schemes is
limited. Although the UK PASs are largely discount
arrangements rather than performance-based risk-shar-
ing arrangements (PBRSAs), the experience is relevant.
Williamson [15] reports on a survey of oncology phar-
macists in 31 NHS hospitals. Transaction costs for the
NHS were the biggest concern. Variation between the
administrative requirements of different schemes added
to the problem. There was a concern that, in some cases,
money due back may not have been claimed. In other
cases, the money came back to the provider hospital
but the purchaser (commissioner) was not aware of
this. The “two schemes linked to a measurement of
clinical response, cetuximab (Erbituxs) and bortezomib
(Velcades), showed a trend towards being the worst.
Response-based schemes pose challenges for tracking
patients and ensuring claims are made to refund
nonresponders” [15]. In contrast, however, a review by
the Department of Health (DH) focused on the additional
numbers of patients receiving access to drugs deemed
cost-effective by NICE (after including transaction costs)
[16].
An example of a PBRSA in the United Kingdom
The UK multiple sclerosis (MS) drugs risk-sharing
scheme (RSS) addresses outcome uncertainty with an
observational study of patient health status with price
linked to a cost-per-quality-adjusted life-year threshold.
The UK MS RSS was negotiated in 2002 between the UK
DH and four pharmaceutical companies supplying MS
drugs following NICE’s rejection of any use of these
drugs by the NHS. It is a 10-year observational study
with a historic cohort as a control. It took 3 years rather
than the expected 18 months to recruit 5000 patients at
73 centers. The results of the 2-year assessment of
accumulated disability of the 5000 patients recruited
were not reported until 2009, 7 years after the agreement
to have a scheme. In reporting the results, Boggild et al.
[17] said that “the outcomes so far obtained in the pre-
specified primary analysis suggest a lack of delay in
disease progression.” Prices, however, were not adjusted
downward on the grounds that the evidence was not
conclusive. This raised issues as to: the design of the
study and the time delays in generating the evidence;
the enforceability of the contract in relation to the link
between prices and outcomes; problems of governance
of the scheme including the independence of the
Scientific Advisory Group (which was vigorously de-
fended by its chair) [18]; the usefulness of the Expanded
Disability Status Scale as the outcome measure; and the
impact on the choice of the comparator when evaluating
subsequent new drugs for the same indications.
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key characteristics:1. There is a program of data collection agreed to between the
manufacturer (or the provider, in some instances) and the
payer. It may be initiated or required by the payer—to address
uncertainties about long-term effectiveness (beyond trial
duration and including possible unintended or adverse con-
sequences), thereby reducing uncertainty about the expected
cost-effectiveness of a medicine (or device or diagnostic) in
the health care system. In some cases, the data collection is
for patient group/population-based studies; in other cases,
individual patients are tracked.2. This data collection is typically initiated during the time period
following the regulatory approval (which may be full, conditional,
or adaptive), and linked to postlaunch coverage decisions. It is
therefore directed at informing payers, providers, and pre-
scribers as decision makers and is not intended as postregis-
tration licensing requirements for further evidence.3. The price, reimbursement, and/or revenue for the product are linked to the
outcome of this program of data collection either explicitly by a pre-
agreed rule or implicitly through an option to renegotiate coverage,
price, or revenue at a later date. In some cases, reimbursement is
linked directly to the performance of the drug in a particular
patient—a form of individual performance guarantee.4. The data collection is intended to address uncertainty about one or
more of the following:
 efﬁcacy or effectiveness in the tested population as com-
pared with the current standard of care;
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neous population than used in registration trials or in
prelicensing testing;
 the effects on long-term or more clinically signiﬁcant end
points than those included in registration trials (which—in
the case of a drug—may have used surrogate markers) or
in prelicensing studies (e.g., for procedures or devices);
 any adverse effects and adherence issues;
 whether health care providers’ management of the patient
will change the relative beneﬁts and harms under con-
ditions of usual care;
 the size and value of cost-offsets, such as due to fewer
hospital visits;
 the proportion of patients who will respond, that is,
achieve a preset (minimum) outcome that may be an
intermediate/surrogate end point;
 the numbers and types of patients likely in real-world
practice to be treated with the new therapy; and
 whether the patients treated are the “right” ones, that is,
they have attributes matching those patients whom, on
the basis of current evidence, the payer is willing to fund
(which may or may not include off-label use).5. These arrangements provide a different distribution of risk between
the payer and the manufacturer than does the historical
manufacturer-payer relationship.
Arrangements that are simply disguised price discounts—and
are not concerned with clinical performance—are excluded from
this deﬁnition. UK PASs include a number of these [11]. However,
a number of operational aspects that underpin a successful
PBRSA apply to such schemes. (See Box 1 for more information
on UK PBRSAs.)
From a broader societal perspective [19], a PBRSA can be
thought of as an investment to gather more data to resolve one
or more of the above-mentioned uncertainties. Any number of
stakeholders may be involved in developing PBRSAs, including
drug and device manufacturers, public and private payers and
insurers, employers ﬁnancing insurance, hospital and physician
providers, central pricing authorities, and regional budget-holders.Fig. 1 – PBRSA Taxonomy. PBRSA, performaFor purposes of this report, the discussion is generically framed in
terms of manufacturers and payers as the two principal parties
involved, recognizing that there can be provider-payer and
provider-manufacturer arrangements as well as other variants.
The fundamental motivation for a PBRSA is that the manufacturer
and the payer hold different views about the potential value of a
new intervention or about their willingness to accept the uncer-
tainty around that value. The manufacturer wants a higher price
or utilization than the payer thinks is justiﬁed given the evidence.
The payer is concerned about “decision uncertainty”—the proba-
bility of paying for a product that might not be effective or cost-
effective in some or all of the patients who receive it following
adoption in their health care system [20].
Investment in a PBRSA should lead to an arrangement that
will better align the rewards to the manufacturer with the value
that the patients—represented by the payers—would assign to
the new intervention. To evaluate the investment as such, in
theory, an analyst would compare the costs of the additional
evidence generation with the beneﬁts in terms of making
improved resource allocation decisions. The short-term, static
efﬁciency beneﬁts, including ensuring that the new intervention
is used in the appropriate population, will be easier to measure
than the long-term, dynamic efﬁciency beneﬁts that come from
aligning incentives in a way that promotes optimal research and
development. Indeed, only the former are usually considered
explicitly and the latter are at best implicit.Taxonomy for PBRSAs
Previous Taxonomies
As noted in the previous section, there are many terms that have
been used to describe the types of arrangements considered in
this article. It is helpful to distinguish those that ﬁt our deﬁnition
from those that do not. To draw these distinctions, we are able to
build on previous taxonomies that have been published in the
literature [2,8,21,22]. For example, McCabe et al. [8] recognize that
such schemes do not always include a research component andnce-based risk-sharing arrangement.
Box 2–United States
What is the general approach and experience in the
United States?
The process for deciding when to do a performance-
based risk-sharing arrangement (PBRSA) in the United
States by both public and private payers has been
opportunistic and ad hoc to date. Within the Medicare
program, this is largely due to two important barriers to
developing a cohesive approach to coverage with
evidence development (CED): unclear statutory author-
ity and the lack of a dedicated funding source.
To date there have been more than 20 documented
PBRSA initiatives in the United States [26]. These
initiatives largely focus on devices and surgical proce-
dures [2]. Only four of these initiatives focused on drugs.
Five were initiated by private industry and the remain-
der by public or private payers. The main form is CED
with no explicit agreement between the manufacturer
and the payer, but an implicit assumption that the data
will be used for future coverage decisions.
Unlike the experience in much of Europe, over one half
of US PBRSAs have been randomized controlled trials
where access is granted only in research (OIR). Data
collection has been supported through diverse public and
private sources, with the majority of clinical trials funded
by the main federal clinical research body—the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). Complex public-private partner-
ships have developed to govern and support the costs of
establishing and maintaining prospective registries used
for only with research (OWR) schemes.
Which entities are involved in the process?
Private insurers were early innovators with the concept
of performance-based risk-sharing, exploring a variant
then known as conditional coverage in the mid-1990s
(fitting into our taxonomy as OIR). Blue Cross Blue Shield
plans with enrollees in the Federal Employee Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP) began a collaborative demon-
stration project examining the use of autologous bone
marrow transplant for the treatment of three diseases:
metastatic breast cancer, epithelia carcinoma, and
multiple myeloma [30]. NIH-funded trials demonstrated
that the risks outweighed the benefits for the treatment
of metastatic breast cancer, leading to the removal of
coverage for that indication. FEHBP members, however,
successfully sued to gain access to the procedure out-
side of the clinical trials. This precedent has made
private payers cautious about mandating participation
in a randomized clinical trial to obtain coverage.
There have been few subsequent attempts at PBRSAs
in the private sector in the United States. None of these
has taken the form of OIR. There have been four
documented performance-based outcomes or process
guarantees between drug or test manufacturers and
private payers since the late 1990s. These arrangements
examined lipid-lowering drugs, diabetes drugs, osteo-
porosis drugs, and a gene expression profiling test used to
identify potential responders to chemotherapy for breast
cancer [31]. Conditional coverage (OWR) was also offered
by one payer in an agreement with a devicemanufacturer
to examine the long-term durability of interventional
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patient, rather than at a population level.
Another taxonomy developed by Carlson et al. [2] was based
on an inventory of published schemes categorized in terms of
timing, execution, and health outcomes. This taxonomy made a
clear distinction between schemes that are based on health
outcomes and those that are not. Towse and Garrison [21] in
their taxonomy also made the distinction between outcome-
based and non–outcome-based and also between 1) those with
agreements that speciﬁed how evidence would be translated into
revisions to price, revenues, and/or use and 2) those that instead
specify an evidence review point where renegotiation would
occur . They made the point that the outcome evidence can
come from a number of sources and study designs, including a
randomized trial on a subset of patients (who may not necessa-
rily be in the same health system) or an observational study of
the patients being treated. They also drew a distinction between
1) uncertainty about the performance of the drug within a
subgroup of patients and 2) uncertainty as to the subgroups of
patients who would in practice receive the drug.
For purposes of deﬁning GRP, we distinguish those payer-
manufacturer arrangements that measure health outcomes in
characterizing performance from those that focus on costs (non-
health outcomes) (Fig. 1). We consider the latter “cost-sharing
arrangements” only, thus falling outside our deﬁnition of a
PBRSA. Examples of such arrangements are budget- or utiliza-
tion-capping, variable or ﬁxed discounts, and price-volume
arrangements not linked to the underlying cost-effectiveness of
treatments in different patient subgroups [23]. A case can be
made that some of these agreements include an element of
population health outcomes in that they are designed to cap
payment at the point at which the population of users is equal to
the target indicated population for which the payer regards the
drug as good value. The Australian price-volume agreements
have this rationale [21]. But given their focus on cost containment
rather than measuring outcomes, GRPs are less relevant.
Among PBRSAs, we follow McCabe et al. [8] and further
distinguish those that attempt to directly manage utilization
and guarantee cost-effectiveness (i.e., “utilization-based”) from
those that include a strong research element (i.e., “research-
based”). The former, performance-linked real-world arrange-
ments have the primary objective of assessing utilization (for
which patients are treated) and/or patient-level outcomes (has a
target outcome been achieved for a patient?). Such schemes
adjust payments and prices in an attempt to ensure cost-
effective use of the technology. However, research-oriented
arrangements are focused on covering the procedure for a period
of time to develop further evidence that will reduce decision
uncertainty about, for instance, the long-term outcomes expected
to be achieved in groups of patients.
Current Taxonomy
Drawing on the previous taxonomies, Figure 1 also depicts these
distinctions. From this ﬁgure, it can be seen that PBRSAs are a
speciﬁc group of schemes among all possible payer-manufacturer
arrangements. Pure “cost-sharing arrangements” shown in gray
on the left-hand side are not within our deﬁnition of PBRSAs or
scope for this report.
The taxonomy separates two types of PBRSA schemes:procedures for the treatment of uterine fibroids [26].
The group most commonly associated with PBRSAs inthe United States is the Medicare program, whichCED schemes whose goal is to provide coverage while the
evidence is developed andinitiated a CED program [32]. Medicare distinguishes
between policies in which coverage is provided only to
study participants (coverage under study protocol, i.e.,
OIR) and those that offer broad access but requireperformance-linked reimbursement schemes whose goal is
to manage utilization, aiming to control the cost-
effectiveness of a new technology in the real world through
performance-linked reimbursement.
additional data collection (coverage with appropriate-
ness determination, i.e., OWR). This distinction is
manifested largely as policies that require further
randomized studies and those that mandate participa-
tion in a registry. Since 1995, the agency has issued 15
CED policies; all but 2 have been coverage under study
protocol, and most have targeted devices or diagnostics.
Recent draft guidance would eliminate the OWR variant,
enable the agency to extend CED to older, established
technologies, and reiterate the ability for its regional
administrative contractors to make individual assess-
ments about the coverage of experimental technologies
in research under the agency’s clinical trials policies [33].
One regional Medicare administrative contractor has
since issued its own policy on CED [34].
Apart from the Medicare program, there are two
state-based programs that are experimenting with CED:
Washington (with spinal surgery) [35] and Minnesota
(with rehabilitative services for autism) [36].
Examples of PBRSAs
Notably, Medicare has used the evidence generated from
CED policies to inform subsequent coverage determina-
tions on only three occasions. These three cases offer
insights into the structure of Medicare CED initiatives and
some of the financial, legal, and operational barriers the
agency has faced in their successful implementation. The
first Medicare CED initiative was the provision of tempor-
ary reimbursement for lung volume reduction surgery for
emphysema treatment only for beneficiaries who partici-
pated in a clinical trial. This initiative had a dramatic
impact on treatment patterns [37]. This well-designed
NIH-funded trial found that apart from a small subpopu-
lation, the surgery potentially increased the risk for
mortality and offered little improvement in quality of life.
Even with this evidence, Medicare extended coverage for
this procedure to all beneficiaries. Yet, the number of
procedures dropped dramatically, as physicians re-
sponded to the trial evidence.
Uncertainty about the diagnostic benefit of positron
emission tomography (PET) for cancer diagnosis, sta-
ging, and monitoring despite growing pressure from the
clinical community for coverage led to the creation of
the National Oncologic PET Registry. Medicare coverage
for selected cancer indications was provided only to
those PET facilities that participated in the registry [38].
Data supporting the hypothesis that the use of PET
changed patient management were weak [28]. None-
theless, Medicare extended coverage for the initial
diagnosis and staging of cancer. Both the lung volume
reduction surgery and PET for cancer cases demonstrate
the difficulty of rescinding coverage once it is offered
provisionally through CED.
In 2006, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
issued a CED policy allowing coverage for percutaneous
transluminal angioplasty and stenting (PTAS) for the
prevention of a second stroke in high-risk Medicare
beneficiaries only when they were enrolled in a trial
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (i.e., OIR).
The results of this study, published in 2011, showed that
patients undergoing PTAS have a much higher rate of
stroke or death (14.7%) than do patients receivingmedical
management alone (5.8%) [39]. As a result, enrollment of
patients in the trial was stopped earlier because of the
high risk of early stroke in patients undergoing PTAS and
Medicare withdrew coverage for high-risk patients.
The use of data for decision making for other
Medicare CED initiatives has been hampered by lack of
funding, and so some studies never got underway or had
slower than anticipated trial enrollment, and by oppor-
tunistic use of ongoing studies to provide evidence that
was not the type of evidence Medicare needed to make
informed decisions [26].
An illustration of a state-based program is the
Washington State study used to inform state coverage
policy for spinal cord stimulation (SCS) for failed back
surgery syndrome. This prospective, controlled cohort
CED study was initiated by Washington State to under-
stand the effectiveness and risks of SCS for chronic back
and leg pain after spine surgery [40]. This study
evaluated outcomes of workers’ compensation recipi-
ents with failed back surgery syndrome who received
SCS with those who either 1) received pain clinic
evaluation with no SCS or 2) received neither SCS nor
pain clinic evaluation. The SCS procedure was covered
only for patients enrolled in the study (i.e., OIR) [35].
After an assessment of both safety and efficacy of the
treatment, there was no evidence for greater effective-
ness of SCS as compared with the alternative treat-
ments. At 6 months, SCS showed a small advantage in
improving leg pain, but only with higher use of opioids,
and the effect disappeared in the long term. Because this
procedure was associated with no benefits beyond 6
months and entailed risks, including one life-threaten-
ing event, state policymakers continued to maintain
noncoverage for SCS for failed back surgery syndrome.
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CED is a payer-manufacturer arrangement that attempts to
reduce decision uncertainty regarding coverage policy. In short,
such schemes link population-level payment or reimbursement
to prospective data collection. They can differ according to the
number of patients within the target population who are
“exposed” to the technology. A CED scheme with either a pre-
agreed adjustment or a later renegotiation could lead to a change
in use (i.e., in the number of subpopulations) and/or a price
change. The result could be more efﬁcient, sending manufac-
turers a clear signal about societal willingness to pay, as well as
restricting or increasing use to the appropriate population(s).
CED PBRSAs can be further subdivided into two groups.
PBRSAs in the ﬁrst group apply to all new indicated patients
who might be treated by using the new technology, with research
taking place only in a subset or even in another health system
(this is called “only with research”—OWR). PBRSAs in the second
group are based only on those patients who were voluntarily
included in an observational study or trial [24] (this is termed
“only in research”—OIR). In the OIR case, not all patients who fall
within the indication will have access or exposure to the new
technology. We include both as examples of PBRSAs relying on
CED. Walker et al. describe the criteria that might lead to the use
of either an OWR or OIR scheme [25]. CED schemes can exist
either with a prespeciﬁed agreement or without: for example, a
public payer might be able to mandate them. PBRSAs without a
prespeciﬁed agreement will require renegotiation (to adjust price,
coverage, or revenues) at a later time based on the results of the
research [26–29]. (See Box 2 for more information on CED in the
United States.)
Performance-Linked Reimbursement PBRSAs
In contrast to these CED arrangements, the other category of
PBRSAs is of those that aim to manage utilization to achieve cost-
effective use of a new technology in the real world. In principle,
such schemes link performance at the individual patient level to
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schemes, payment is related to the process of care, and these
PBRSAs can also be considered as programs to promote good
quality of care. This means that reimbursement is speciﬁed
ex ante to depend on the clinical decision-making process, for
example, a provider’s compliance with clinical guidelines or the
selection of individual patients on the basis of a biomarker, such
as a genetic test.
Other performance-linked schemes focus on ex post reim-
bursement, measuring intermediate or clinical end points. The-
se arrangements include 1) “outcomes guarantees”—meaning
payment for responders only—or 2) “conditional treatment
continuation”—meaning payment for the continued use of the
product based on intermediate end points. Thus, in contrast to
CED, reimbursement in these schemes is generally determi-
ned for each individual patient, either prospectively by rule or
retrospectively by result. Nevertheless, it would generally be
possible, in theory, to aggregate the data collected in such real-
world utilization to the population level to adjust overall pay-
ments post hoc. In addition, for research purposes, post hoc
analyses to support additional population-level decision making
are a possibility if the relevant patient-level data have been
collected.GRPs for PBRSAs: Overview of Key Good Practice
Questions
For those PBRSAs whose goal is to provide coverage while the
evidence is developed, either the payer or both the payer and the
manufacturer together will have to address four research-related,
good practice questions concerning the following: Q1) the desir-
ability of the PBRSA (as opposed to some other form of reim-
bursement or research arrangement), Q2) the choice of research
design, Q3) the approach to implementation, and Q4) the evalua-
tion method to be used. In some instances, the payer and the
manufacturer (or the service provider) may have to reach a
formal legal agreement as to why the PBRSA is desirable and
under what conditions it will move forward. In others, the payer
may unilaterally decide to delay approval and collect additional
data, or recommend or require another party to collect it. For
those PBRSAs that aim to manage real-world utilization and
guarantee the cost-effectiveness of a new technology, some or
all of the four good practice questions will also be relevant,
depending on the nature of the arrangement.
Q1. Desirability: Is a PBRSA an appropriate way forward given the
uncertainty and the alternative methods to reduce this uncertainty?
When Is a PBRSA Worthwhile or Desirable?
The key issue is that at product launch the payer could have
considerable uncertainty as to whether the product or service
offers good value for money. In theory, a payer has four major
options [21,41]:1. Adopt (or partially adopt) despite the uncertainties, with the
option to revisit the decision if more information becomes
available.2. Refuse to adopt until the manufacturer supplies better evi-
dence to address the uncertainties.3. Demand or mandate a lower price such that the uncertainty
about value for the payer is reduced.4. Enter into a PBRSA that a) manages utilization/outcome at the
patient level or b) is a form of CED in which evidence is
collected across patients for a review, potentially leading to
prespeciﬁed adjustments or later ad hoc adjustments in price
or utilization.Each of these options is associated with costs and beneﬁts. A
value-of-information (VOI) framework—comparing the costs of
additional data collection with the beneﬁts of improved resource
allocation decisions—can be used for weighing these options [42-44].
The general desirability question is one as to whether a PBRSA
can effectively and efﬁciently address the uncertainties that
remain following marketing authorization.
Issues that would need to be considered include the following: the expected value(s) of research options in terms of reduced
uncertainties for the parties to the agreement. The value of
any additional research (and, therefore, of a CED or research-
based PBRSA) will depend in part on the price of the medical
product and its expected use in the patient population; the direct cost (in terms of out-of-pocket costs and admin-
istrative burden) of collecting evidence; the opportunity cost (in terms of expected health loss in the
population) of any delays in access that might result from the
use of a scheme; and the existence of any irreversibility in the process—for exam-
ple, if an adoption decision would make subsequent with-
drawal of the product much more difﬁcult or make research
less feasible or even impossible in some circumstances [3,25].
Where research may be made less feasible by adoption, then
conducting research in another health system may enable
research to take place alongside use (i.e., OWR) or, in other
cases, the PBRSA can restrict adoption to a form of OIR.
A utilization-based PBRSA can change the expected cost-
effectiveness by changing the effective price or use of the product
through, for example, an outcome guarantee or the use of an
intermediate response as part of conditional treatment continu-
ation. There will be implementation costs associated with such a
scheme. The relative merits of research-based PBRSAs and
utilization-based PBRSAs will need to be assessed alongside the
other options of a) adoption without any expectation of further
evidence collection, b) a refusal to adopt until further evidence is
available, or c) adoption at a lower price.
Desirable for Whom?
When a manufacturer and a payer negotiate coverage and
reimbursement, a manufacturer considering a PBRSA will have
to weigh the pros and cons of the additional complexity and cost
of the PBRSA against alternatives, for example, offering an
upfront price reduction [22]. But to assess complexity and cost,
the manufacturer will also need to address questions Q2 to Q4—
evidence collection, implementation, and evaluation—while pay-
ing attention to the perspectives of payers, prescribers, providers,
and patients.
In these instances, whether to propose or accept a PBRSA will
be a business decision for the manufacturer and a business and/
or political decision for the payer. When either party proposes the
use of a PBRSA, it should have established that a valid and
efﬁcient process of evidence collection following good professio-
nal practice is feasible, and it should be realistic regarding
acceptable levels of uncertainty as well as the cost of data
collection and the implementation challenges of the scheme.
Neither party is per se subject to a discussion of GRPs, although a
payer may indicate scientiﬁc research criteria that have to be
met. In any case, the resulting data need to be robust enough to
address the key uncertainties whether the scheme operates at an
individual patient level (a form of performance-based reimburse-
ment) or at a population-level (a form of CED).
PBRSAs can be desirable from the manufacturer’s perspective
because they may be a way to overcome payers’ aversion for risk
and reduce time to market access. If the alternative is extending
Box 3–France
Which entities are involved in the process?
In France, the two entities involved in performance-
based risk-sharing arrangements (PBRSAs) are the
Transparency Commission (TC) and the Pricing Com-
mittee (PC). The TC gives advice on access to reimbur-
sement to the Service Me´dical Rendu (SMR; Provided
Medical Service) and rates the relative effectiveness of
drugs (Ame´lioration du Service Me´dical Rendu [AMSR;
Improvement of Provided Medical Service]), and it will
often require a postlaunch observational study focusing
on the use of a new product in real life. The results of
such studies are also of interest for the PC, which will
adjust its price-volume requirements to the results of
the observational studies. The PC can, independently of
the TC, also ask for specific studies. Manufacturers
must get prior approval from the TC for their planned
design of the postlaunch study. This advice is given by
an internal expert group of the French HTA Agency
(Haute Autorite´ de Sante´ [HAS]), but does not commit
the HAS. At termination, the study results are evaluated
by the Directorate for Evaluation of the HAS, which may
require external advice. The results of the evaluation
are transmitted to the TC and the PC if the latter is
involved. At the time of reassessment, the TC can use
other data alongside the postlaunch study, and the
company can also provide the TC with complementary
data, and so it is difficult to assess the specific impact of
the postlaunch study.
Public authorities sometimes claim that manufac-
turers unnecessarily delay the launch of studies. In the
new law on drugs, which is under legislative considera-
tion, financial penalties will be increased for manufac-
turerswho do not comply with the TC’s requirement in a
timely way. Manufacturers sometimes complain a) that
the studies requested by the TC are not appropriate
(observational studies that will seldom lead to a
controlled assessment of efficacy, for example), or
unrealistic (use of a given molecule will change), or too
broad (requiring a study of all available treatments in the
same indication), and b) that the delays in studies are
mainly due to the slow assessment of protocols by the
internal expert group.
What is the general approach and experience in France?
The main types of products that are subject to such
requirements are a) expensive products, with high
uncertainties at the time of launch, or b) drugs for the
treatment of high-prevalence diseases and so with
potential high budget impact, such as cardiovascular
diseases and associated risk factors, diabetes, drugs for
mental health, and antibiotics.
The results of such studies are used in the 5-year
reassessment of each drug by the TC, and also for the
price readjustment. There is often, however, not a
prespecified relation between the results of the study
(performance) and reassessment. About 140 postlaunch
studies have been requested since 2000, but there is little
public evidence of how their results have affected the
reassessment, although such a study, comparing the
first TC assessment to consecutive ones, is possible. But
it is more difficult to assess the impact on prices because
pricing agreements based on postlaunch studies are
kept confidential.
In some cases, the TC will ask manufacturers with
competing products to collaborate over a common
registry, or cohort study. In a much publicized study on
cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) inhibitors called CADEUS
(COX2 Inhibitors and Non Steroidal Anti Inflammatory
Drugs: Description of Users)—at the time of the launch
of rofecoxib (Vioxx) and celecoxib (Celebrex)—the man-
ufacturers involved were asked to fund a public research
center study to assess the claim of better gastrointest-
inal safety of COX-2s relative to nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs. Before the results of the study
were published, rofecoxib was withdrawn from the
market, and celecoxib had its price cut.
Another typical example of such studies is when the
public authorities anticipate that there may be off-label
use of a drug, with high budget impact. In this case, the
TC will ask for a study of the actual use of the drug to
identify use in off-label indications, and the PC would
eventually set a target of acceptable off-label use, which
—if not met—would have an impact on price rebates.
The PC may be changing its position on PBRSAs. The
previous PC chairperson argued that if there are too
many uncertainties, manufacturers should invest more
in their clinical development before they ask for
reimbursement, and should expect to be rejected or to
receive a low price to deal with the uncertainty.
However, if the drug is promising, manufacturers will
have to provide the payer with additional observational
data, and reimbursement and prices will be renegotiated
according to the outcomes of the study. If manufacturers
make a reasonable claim on an attribute of a new
treatment (that cannot be demonstrated in a trial) to ask
for a premium price, and if they can provide specific
postlaunch data to sustain this claim, then the PC can
accept a higher price. The new PC chairperson has
publicly declared an interest in PBRSAs, stating that a
better price could be granted if outcomes of studies were
positive. He expects such agreements to be as simple as
possible, so as to have a rapid answer to questions of
uncertainty raised at the time of launch.
Examples of PBRSAs in France
Among the 140 postlaunch studies, 3 have received some
publicity because they are specifically PBRSAs. In each case,
the PC was the main instigator of the agreements.
One involves dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP4) inhibitors
(“gliptins”) for patients with type 2 diabetes. DPP4
inhibitors are a relatively new class of oral antidiabetic
medications. They have sought reimbursement as an
alternative to sulfonamides in association with metfor-
min when first-line metformin has failed. They have not
demonstrated better efficacy for glycemic control, but
they provide a better tolerability profile. There are also
experimental data to suggest that their efficacy to lower
hemoglobin A1C lasts longer, delaying treatment escala-
tion. At the first round of negotiation, the PC was ready
to offer only a small premium price over existing
alternatives for dual therapy. The manufacturers were
able to convince the PC to let them proceed to a large
real-world study to demonstrate their claim on dur-
ability. Thus, they were able to obtain a better price than
expected, but with the condition that if the study did not
support their claim, they would have to pay back the
difference, between the agreed-upon price and the
initial price, retrospectively for all sales. All new DPP4
inhibitors have been subject to the same agreement. The
results for the first gliptins should be available in the
first half of 2013.
A similar agreement was made for glitazones: the
claim was also made that this class of antidiabetic drugs
would delay escalation to insulin therapy. The goal was
not reached, and prices were adjusted downward.
The third involves a controlled-release form of
risperidone for the treatment of patients with schizo-
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phrenia. In this case, the TC concluded that therewas no
major improvement versus conventional treatment, and
granted an ASMR 5 rating, leading to the same price as
those of existing medications. The company argued for a
better ranking, claiming that the controlled release form
would lead to more patient compliance and thus to
fewer hospital admissions. The PC accepted a higher
initial price subject to the performance of a postlaunch
study to demonstrate a potential reduction in the
number of hospital admissions. The study’s results
supported the company’s argument.
Since October 2012, companies have had a mandate
to submit a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) at first
request for coverage for drugs considered as innovative
(ASMR 1–3) and with an expected high budget impact.
For such products, a CEA will also be required at the 5-
year review, based on “real-life data,” alongside other
postlaunch evidence required on effectiveness and
safety. In none of these cases do these requirements
for supplementary evidence prespecify what is to be
provided.
Table 1 – Factors affecting selection of randomized
vs. observational design.
Factors favoring
randomized design
Factors favoring
observational design
 Relative efﬁcacy remains a
question of interest even after
premarket studies
 Feasible to randomize
 Prognostic variables are
unclear; most variation in
outcomes is unexplained
 Biologic process of disease is
not well understood
 Risk of getting the answer
wrong is large (large impact
on mortality, resource use, or
treatment patterns)
 Prognostic variables are
unclear; most variation in
outcomes is unexplained
 Modest anticipated
differences in effect size
 Relative effectiveness is of
interest
 Effect size is relatively large
and/or selection bias can be
reasonably controlled
 Relatively rare and serious
adverse events are the most
important outcomes of
interest
 Major focus is on adherence or
compliance with therapy
 Interest in associations of
outcomes by patient
subgroups, observed practice
patterns
 Risk of getting the answer
wrong is low
 Cost or resource utilization is
the main interest
Adapted from J Compar Effect Res 2012;1(3):281–92 with permis-
sion of Future Medicine Ltd.
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demonstrating a sufﬁcient beneﬁt or improvement in effect, 2)
reducing the period of exclusivity associated with patent protec-
tion, and 3) enabling a competitor to come into the market with
similar or better results before the manufacturer has entered the
market.
For payers, denying reimbursement on the basis of signiﬁcant
uncertainty runs the risk of depriving patients of the potential
beneﬁts of a new medical product. On the one hand, they may
thus face political criticism for any loss of societal welfare if the
product is later found to be cost-effective. On the other hand,
they face ﬁnancial consequences and criticism for any losses if
the product is not cost-effective and/or provides little or no
beneﬁt to patients. It may also, in these circumstances, provide
a poor benchmark as a standard of care for comparison with
future treatments.
It is worth noting that these perspectives may not be sym-
metric: payers may lose less in the short term by forgoing an
agreement. High uncertainty with regard to effectiveness may
easily justify denial of reimbursement or severe restrictions on
indications, which is politically sustainable and may be seen as
ﬁnancially prudent. PBRSAs may well seem more desirable for
manufacturers than for payers. Yet, the use of a PBRSA
(as opposed to a denial) may be socially optimal, as well as in
the commercial interest of the manufacturer. (See Box 3 on the
postlaunch studies in France.)
PBRSAs, if not well designed, may facilitate the pursuit of
suboptimal strategies by either manufacturers or payers. For
example, in a CED scheme with no prespeciﬁed agreement as
to how price changes (prospectively or retrospectively) or as to
how use changes in the light of study ﬁndings, both parties may
engage in suboptimal behavior. Manufacturers might deﬁne their
price target according to the anticipated risk of not meeting the
target (i.e., go for the highest price possible if they think that the
study will not support their claim) and delay evidence collection
for as long as possible. Payers might—if they have substantial
bargaining power—set their price offer low, that is, well
below their reservation (highest) price and set a high target
outcome for the study to increase the probability of a product
failing to meet its target. They may refuse to increase the
(low) price they have offered to pay even if the study shows
that the outcomes exceed the target linked to the preset price.
The payoffs to such behaviors can be reduced by prespeciﬁedagreements—for example, requiring retrospective rebates to dis-
courage such manufacturer behavior or by requiring prices to rise
when the target outcomes are exceeded to discourage such payer
behavior.
Finally, it is important to remember that the payer is the agent
of plan beneﬁciaries, who can also be patients: PBRSAs are
efﬁcient only if they make beneﬁciaries as a whole better off in
terms of health outcomes and plan costs. Of course, equity and
other social factors can come into play in addressing willingness
to accept uncertainty, for example, with regard to orphan drugs.
Q2. Evidence collection: Which PBRSA research design is most appro-
priate to collect evidence that addresses the relevant uncertainties?
The answer will depend on the nature and type of the uncer-
tainty that the PBRSA evidence collection is trying to address: Uncertainty about whether the medical product or service will
be used in the right patients, which may be an important
question because not all patients will respond, or because
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness differ across indications
or patient groups. Uncertainty at launch about clinical or economic outcomes
(effectiveness vs. efﬁcacy, ﬁnal outcomes vs. surrogates, or
about the size of cost offsets).
The preferred study design will differ for questions such as
the optimal subset of patients in an indication versus questions
about the transferability of an efﬁcacy result to effectiveness in
the real world.
GRPs for evidence collection in PBRSAs should build on
previous GRPs for speciﬁc types of studies. Previous ISPOR Task
Forces have deﬁned GRPs in a number of relevant areas: model-
ing, nonrandomized studies of treatment effects, randomized
controlled trials (RCTs), retrospective database analysis, and
prospective observational studies [45–49]. Although ISPOR and
others have developed GRPs around a wide range of study
designs, much less work has been done linking particular designs
to speciﬁc research questions. This linkage or translation is an
Box 4– Italy
Which entities are involved in the process?
In Italy, the two entities involved in performance-based
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effectiveness research [50,51].
The number of general options for research design to collect
data postlaunch on new products is fairly limited and reasonably
well deﬁned. These include the following:risk-sharing arrangements (PBRSAs) are the Italian
Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco [AIFA])
and the National Health Service (NHS). To guarantee the a traditional targeted RCT, focusing on efﬁcacy;
affordability of innovative and expensive medicines, it is
viewed as pivotal to have an approach that links the use
of a medicine to the clinical outcomes obtained. The lacka larger pragmatic clinical trial, randomized but with less
rigorous entry inclusion or exclusion criteria and minimal
interference with usual follow-up care;of evidence in the real-world clinical setting, in particular
for innovative medicines, has motivated AIFA to usea prospective observational study of patients without ran-
domization including a comparator; andconditional reimbursement schemes (also known as
managed entry agreements [MEAs]) and monitoring
registries to collect data on safety and effectiveness.
Within an MEA context, various instruments such as
price-volume agreements, cost-sharing, budget cap,
monitoring registries, payment by results, risk sharing,
therapeutic plans, and “AIFA notes” are used to manage
budget impact, uncertainty around clinical- and cost-
effectiveness, and appropriate utilization of medicines.
What is the general approach and experience in Italy?
One of the most important instruments for MEAs in
Italy is drug-monitoring registries. For example, the
Cancer Drugs Register covers all the prescription centers
in Italy with a population of over 100,000 oncology
patients.
These registries aim to assess and track patient
eligibility, evaluate utilization in clinical practice, collect
epidemiological data including data on the safety
profile, and collect additional information that was
missing at the first evaluation stage. This should
guarantee appropriate use of medicines according to
their therapeutic indications.
The AIFAmonitoring registries are online tools. Patient
case report forms must be filled in by using a specific
Web-based monitoring register. Since 2006, a total of 78
therapeutic indications related to 66 active compounds
were recorded in the monitoring registries, distributed as
follows: 30 for antineoplastic drugs, 14 for orphan drugs,
1 project for the treatment of psoriasis, 1 for a
cardiovascular drug, 2 for ophthalmic drugs, 2 for
rheumatoid arthritis drugs, 2 for diabetes drugs, 2 for
dermatological drugs, 2 for respiratory drugs, 1 for an
osteoporosis drug, and 2 specific projects for multiple
sclerosis and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder . Of
the 78 therapeutic indications using a monitoring
registry, 28 are also part of a conditional reimbursement
agreement. AIFA uses the terms “cost sharing” (when
there is a price reduction for initial treatment cycles until
it is clear whether a patient is responding), “payment by
results” (when the manufacturer reimburses the payer
for nonresponders), and “risk sharing” (when only 50% of
the costs of the nonresponders are reimbursed by the
manufacturer). Cost sharing applies a general discount to
all eligible patients at the beginning of treatment,
whereas both risk sharing and payment by result use a
payback mechanism to compensate for the treatment
costs of nonresponders. In terms of implementation, the
system of applying an initial discount to all eligible
patients used in the cost-sharing scheme is simpler to
administer than the system of reimbursement for
nonresponders used in the risk-sharing and payback
schemes.
In terms of the mix of schemes, there are 12
indications reimbursed under a cost-sharing scheme, 2
indications under a risk-sharing scheme, and 14 indica-
tions under a payment-by-results scheme. All threea hybrid design that includes the use of prospective observa-
tional cohorts and retrospective data to provide a comparator.
Each of these designs has strengths and weaknesses in the
context of PBRSAs. Table 1, adapted from Gliklich et al. [50],
summarizes the factors that favor either a randomized design or
an observational design. What is important for a PBRSA is that
the study is designed to answer the question at hand, that is, to
address the speciﬁc uncertainty that most increases the like-
lihood of a bad decision. Historically, there is a general con-
sensus that properly sized RCTs are the strongest method for
determining a treatment effect. They can be criticized, however,
for having limited generalizability across practice settings as
well as for measuring efﬁcacy rather than effectiveness. Large
pragmatic clinical trials can be costly and difﬁcult to manage,
but they can offer a better estimate of real-world effectiveness.
Prospective observational studies, for example, using data col-
lection from electronic patient records or disease registries, can
be useful for estimating real-world effectiveness as well as the
relationship between surrogate end points and long-term out-
comes. (See Box 4 for more information on PBRSAs in Italy.)
These studies can be comparative by including a comparator or
by using historical or matched controls. Methods such as
propensity scoring can be used to correct for the likely selection
bias. Retrospective study designs can be helpful for measuring
historical controls or relationships between surrogate end
points and long-term outcomes. They also require adjustment
for selection bias.
Under randomized design, there is a continuum from more
explanatory to more pragmatic designs. For assessing compara-
tive or relative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, the more
pragmatic designs are preferred, including the parsimonious use
of inclusion/exclusion criteria, clinically meaningful outcomes,
protocols that interfere minimally with practice patterns, and
usual care settings.
Observational studies, for example, linked to a patient registry
or postmarketing surveillance cohort studies, could be feasible to
monitor the effectiveness and safety of investigated medicines in
clinical practice. After the period of the study observation, results
could be modeled to investigate whether the continued use of a
PBRSA is cost-effective.
Although most PBRSAs to date (with the exception of a
number of those in the United States) have not been based on
an RCT design, it is an important option. An RCT can be designed
to clarify an aspect of efﬁcacy or explore effects in a key subgroup
of patients or in the validation of a biomarker. If it is not possible
to conduct an RCT alongside use of the product by the payer, then
the RCT could be conducted either in an OIR scheme or in an
OWR scheme in which the PBRSA relied on RCT data collected in
another jurisdiction, providing any necessary adjustments for the
transferability of data are made [52,53].
GRP, as Hutton et al. [5] have emphasized, requires outcome
measures to be selected with care. They should be clear, meas-
urable, objective, realistically achievable, and relevant. All parties
models include a health outcomes element in the form
of evaluation of the treatment efficacy and continuation
of treatment conditional on a positive response to the
drug. The main differences lie in the financial arrange-
ments.
Examples of PBRSAs in Italy
An example of a medicine for which a registry was
created is aliskiren (Rasilez) used to treat essential
hypertension. In Italy, aliskiren was reimbursed by the
NHS only after the compilation of a registry by specialist
centers. AIFA also included aliskiren in its Monitoring
Register for Cardiovascular Medicines to investigate the
safety profile. Two years of observational data showed
that aliskiren reduced both systolic blood pressure and
diastolic blood pressure in patients enrolled and had a
good safety profile. The register was a very useful tool to
examine the utilization of aliskiren as a second-line
treatment. Based on the data presented in the registry,
the following decisions were taken: the shift of pre-
scribing responsibility to general practitioners, a price
reduction of aliskiren to align the price to other
hypertensive medicines, and introduction of a pharma-
ceutical expenditure ceiling. To define possible pharma-
ceutical expenditure ceiling, a budget impact analysis
was completed, projecting the utilization of aliskiren as
a second-line treatment.
An example of a cost-sharing scheme in oncology
involves two oral drugs for renal cell carcinoma:
sorafenib and sunitinib. In this scheme, the hospital
receives a discount of 50% for the first 2/3 months of
treatment. If a patient responds, the treatment is
reimbursed and the discount is dropped [2].
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design: Is the type of evidence being promised sufﬁcient to address
the uncertainty in both quantitative and qualitative terms? Are the end points the desired outcomes (or acceptable
surrogates)? In the case of CED schemes, is the duration of study sufﬁcient
to deliver a result against the measures, and is the study
population sufﬁciently representative?
Choice of outcomes for PBRSAs will also be inﬂuenced by the
scope of regulatory approval, especially for drugs. If the manu-
facturer wishes to use a PBRSA’s results for promotion, any
claims need to be consistent with the label.
Q3. Implementation: How should a PBRSA be implemented, governed,
and reported?
Implementation
Aspects of good implementation follow from clarity on the desir-
ability of using a PBRSA and on the type of evidence being collected
as part of the PBRSA. These aspects have been addressed in the
literature, notably in the 2009 Banff Summit principles [54], and by
Hutton et al. [5]. They include the following: Is the scheme measuring appropriate outcomes? PBRSAs should be
clinically robust, clinically plausible, appropriate, and moni-
torable. For example, if the scheme is based on a patient
response, there must be a relatively straightforward way to
measure a patient’s clinical response. Standard procedures for
reporting and analysis of adverse events will need to be
followed. Are the costs acceptable? The cost to the commissioning body or
health care system arising from the PBRSA should be propor-
tionate to the potential gains. For example, we note the
requirements expressed in the UK Pharmaceutical Price Reg-
ulation Scheme that relate to both CED and performance-
linked reimbursement schemes [11]:
 When considering the burden, the full cost—in terms of both
direct monetary costs and the opportunity cost of staff time—
to the health care system of any PAS should be included in
the costs considered by the commissioning body.
 Any scheme should be operationally manageable and
without unduly complex monitoring, disproportionate
additional costs, and bureaucracy.
 Any burden for the health care system should be propor-
tionate to the beneﬁts of the scheme for the system and
patients. Is the time horizon realistic? A PBRSA process should set clear
target dates by which the future contingent access decision
will be made. Although this can vary by disease, Hutton
et al. [5] suggest that a PBRSA study period longer than 3
years faces the risk of becoming increasingly irrelevant in
the face of changing clinical practice and technological
advancement. Even so, difﬁculties can easily arise if, for
example, patient recruitment to studies is slower than
planned. They further explain that if a PBRSA continues
indeﬁnitely, without the beneﬁt of new evidence, it merely
replicates the unsatisfactory situation that gave rise to it in
the ﬁrst place (i.e., coverage with inadequate evidence). It is
important then that all participants of the PBRSA make sure
that the collection of relevant new data can be accom-
plished within a realistic period before entering into a
scheme. Are the funding arrangements clear? There is a general presump-
tion that manufacturers and sponsors of technologies will
ﬁnance extra data collection but this may not always be the
case. There are examples where governments have agreed to
fund arrangements (e.g., Medical Services Advisory Commit-
tee in Australia and Catalan Agency for Health Technology
Assessment in Spain). The United Kingdom Multiple Sclerosis
Risk Sharing Scheme (UK MS RSS) was jointly funded by the
Department of Health and the companies involved [17,55]. How is responsibility for undertaking data collection and analysis
allocated? In a CED scheme, it should be subject to normal
research governance arrangements as described in the next
section. Is the data collection efﬁcient? For efﬁciency purposes and to
answer questions about effectiveness, the design will often
make use of extensive data collected routinely (e.g., claims
data, lab and pharmacy data, and hospital and electronic
medical records). But prospective study designs for PBRSAs
that rely on these records present a number of issues and
challenges in terms of implementation. What will be the process for reviewing and analyzing the evidence to
make a revised decision on price, revenue, or coverage? A PBRSA
should have a process in place to underpin a “Decision with
Further Evidence” [5]. In some agreements, there will be a
preagreed link between the evidence and the ﬁnal decision
(e.g., an adjustment to price to ensure a cost-per-quality-
adjusted life-year of a speciﬁc amount) that will be subject to
arbitration and appeal arrangements. In others, use of the
analysis to change price, revenues, or coverage will be subject
to negotiation. Will discounts or rebates be paid during the course of the scheme
(e.g., based on provisional results)? In performance-linked
reimbursement schemes, such as responder-based reim-
bursement, this is integral to the scheme provided that
such provisional arrangements support the needs of the
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 6 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 7 0 3 – 7 1 9714health care organization and avoid being excessively
burdensome.Governance
Some PBRSAs are bilateral commercial agreements between a
private payer and a manufacturer, such as the case between
Merck and Cigna for selected antidiabetic drugs in the United
States [31]. In these situations, a formal governance structure is
not essential. This is also the case when the arrangements are
between a public payer and a manufacturer for utilization
schemes (as in Italy [Box 4] or the United Kingdom [Box 1]) or
where an agreement between the public payer and the manu-
facturer involves a price adjustment linked to the outcome of
research within an existing formal structure for such arrange-
ments (as in the case of the UK CED only-with-research patient
access scheme for pazopanib [Votrient]).
In other cases, PBRSAs involve agreements among multiple
stakeholders, and the need for formal governance structures is
greater. For example, in the United States, the creation of the
implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator registry in support of Medicare’s
2005 CED decision involved a partnership among professional
associations, public and private insurers, and federal sponsors of
clinical research, hospitals, a quality improvement organization,
and others [26]. The implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator registry is
managed by the American College of Cardiology. Funding for the
registry is sustained through fees levied on participating hospi-
tals. Research funding came from a variety of sources including
the Health Insurance Plans, the National Institutes of Health, and
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Medicare fund-
ing pays only for the implanted devices. The UK MS RSS was led
by a Steering Group that included the four sponsors of medicines
concerned, the Association of British Neurologists, the Multiple
Sclerosis Society and Trust, the Royal College of Nursing, and the
Association of Multiple Sclerosis Nurses [56].
Those PBRSAs that have multiple stakeholders and/or the
involvement of taxpayer funding of research as well as payment
for the intervention should be governed through a diverse steer-
ing committee that includes patients, manufacturers, disease
advocacy groups, professional associations, and other major
stakeholders, with a channel for receiving broad public comment.
In these circumstances, it is essential that there be a formal
governance structure in place to ensure transparency of the
nature and aims of the scheme, accountability, and a means to
mitigate conﬂicts. Many schemes have failed to date when the
original aim, research design, or data collection was changed as a
result of competing aims in the political arena among stake-
holders [55,57].
Transparency of process is important. A more controversial
issue is transparency about any CED pricing arrangement. The
value of new products—and therefore their price—will vary
among different payers and settings, and revealing prices may
lead to some payers referencing lower prices elsewhere rather
than looking to pay for the value established by the scheme in
their own health system. Thus, transparency of price is unlikely
to contribute to the efﬁciency of a PBRSA.
Effective governance will require the following: The governance committee should have a clear charter
specifying who is involved and their respective roles. Sign-
off procedures for research design and study protocols are
recommended between the governance committee and prin-
cipal investigators. The governance agreements should specify the aims of the
PBRSA, who has access to data, who can publish, the process
for vetting manuscripts, and the ﬁnal steps for managing and
disseminating the research—that is, the stopping rules for
data collection, and how the results will be used. Funding arrangements should be clearly speciﬁed upfront with
clear information about the types of information or products
each funder will receive as a result of its involvement. The agreements should spell out a process to ensure data
quality, including the conduct of regular audits. All conﬂicts of interest should be declared, and to avert undue
political inﬂuence over the outcome and to achieve the clearly
stated initial aims of the scheme, it is desirable to have a
process in place for the independent review of research
designs and the neutral, independent conduct of the research.Reporting of Results
Most PBRSAs to date involve a public payer. One could argue that
PBRSA contracts between private payers and manufacturers have
a different status in terms of public reporting of results. Recently,
for both ethical and legal reasons, both private and public entities
that sponsor prospective RCTs have assumed greater public
reporting requirements; for example, they have to report whether
an intervention “worked or not.” From an evaluation standpoint,
however, because the reporting obligations or practices vary
between public and private payers, the types of information
available to third parties for any evaluation are likely to differ.
Given that the evidence generated could be a public good,
there would seem to be a case for some explicit requirements for
the disclosure of such public information. When a private payer
and manufacturer agree to a PBRSA, there may not be clear
reporting requirements in terms of what must be made public. In
fact, historically, most of these transactions were viewed as
conﬁdential and proprietary.
In recent years, however, with the advent of public reporting
requirements, such as clinical trials.gov, there seems to be a
growing recognition that when these activities involve the vol-
untary participation of patients, there is an ethical and profes-
sional obligation to report on research results—at least for
prospective clinical trials.
The public goods aspects of the information generated by
PBRSAs should not be overlooked. The incentives for manufac-
turers, public payers, and private payers to rely on research
evidence generated by others are always there [4,58–60]. From a
global (societal) perspective, free riding on evidence already
generated is a good thing in the short run but it reduces the
incentives for investment in new evidence collection by any
individual payer and/or manufacturer if the appropriation of
evidence affects its competitive position. Even where payers
and/or manufacturers are not competing, they will underinvest
because they are not aware of the value to others of the evidence
that they might generate through a PBRSA. New PBRSAs that
follow GRPs may need to be subsidized or encouraged to over-
come these disincentives.
Q4. Evaluation: Has the PBRSA achieved its objectives? Was it good
value from a health system perspective?
This question links back to expectations/assumptions in Q1,
which can be addressed from multiple perspectives—manufac-
turer, payer, patient, provider, and society. We can ask several
different questions including the following: Are we more knowl-
edgeable about the technology in question? Have patients bene-
ﬁted from access? How do the costs of the scheme relate to the
value of the beneﬁts?
A comprehensive evaluation will therefore need to consider
multiple perspectives. Certainly, patient, provider, manufacturer,
and payer satisfaction with the scheme will need to be assessed.
From a societal perspective, a PBRSA can be viewed as an
investment decision to gather more data about product perform-
ance, and can be appraised against alternatives. Some national
health systems (and some private plans) have the stated or
Box 5–Value of information and the evaluation of perfor-
mance-based risk-sharing arrangements (PBRSAs)
For any PBRSA scheme to be viable ex ante, but
particularly for coverage with evidence development
schemes (both only with research and only in research ),
there must be the potential for value to be generated by
further evidence generation, and the expected value of
that information must exceed the expected cost of the
scheme designed to generate that evidence. Despite this,
the role of formal value-of-information (VOI) techniques
at the ex post evaluation phase of a scheme is limited.
This is because one should not, as a starting point for
such an analysis, simply take the assessment of the
expected value of perfect information (EVPI) before the
scheme was implemented and net out the EVPI left after
the evidence generation to estimate the value for the
data that were collected. The reason for this is that EVPI
describes the expected value of perfect information
across all possible realizations of where uncertainty
resolves. However, in any given realization of a particular
study, although parameter uncertainty will usually be
reduced, consideration has to be given to the effect of
that realization on “decision uncertainty,” which also
drives the EVPI calculation. In some circumstances, the
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covered population given a ﬁxed annual budget. Any appraisal of
a PBRSA in those schemes should consider the opportunity cost
of health care resources in terms of health and related gains
foregone.
Some of the additional costs of data collection, including
negotiation, monitoring, and assessment, can be measured rela-
tively easily. It will be more difﬁcult to measure other costs, such
as the foregone beneﬁts to patients not receiving access during
the data collection if the design is based on an OIR scheme. A full
assessment will also need to consider reversal effects, that is,
whether the evidence collected led to changes in the use of the
technology or in its price. It may be difﬁcult to change provider
and patient behavior in response to a subsequent restriction in
use, and a change in price may be resisted by manufacturers (if it
is downwards) or payers (if it is upwards).
Although a PBRSA scheme (either a performance-linked
reimbursement scheme or a CED scheme) may have been
developed with the principles of VOI in mind (that the beneﬁts
associated with generating additional evidence exceed the costs
of generating that evidence), there are challenges in using these
techniques at the evaluation phase in the case of a CED scheme.
Ultimately, it is impossible to assess the ex post VOI generated
for a single CED scheme. (See Box 5 for a discussion of this
issue.)VOI following a PBRSA scheme may increase, not
because of parameter uncertainty, but because of
increased decision uncertainty.
For example, consider the first panel of Figure 2,
which shows the estimated cost-effectiveness of a new
technology as a distribution of incremental net-mone-
tary-benefit (INMB) prior to a PBRSA. The potential cost-
effectiveness is shown by a positive mean INMB, but
with a wide variance and a 16% chance that the decision
could be incorrect—themeasure of decision uncertainty.
Following a PBRSA, the uncertainty in the INMB is
reduced as is indicated by the more precisely estimated
INMB distribution in the second panel of the figure.
However, because the location of the distribution is now
closer to the decision threshold (INMB ¼ 0) (the meanEvaluation Questions
Because one cannot assess the VOI generated by a single CED
scheme directly post hoc, there is a need to rely on process
indicators of the scheme’s success. It will be an important part of
the design of any PBRSA (performance-linked reimbursement or
CED) scheme to deﬁne the metrics by which the success of that
scheme can be assessed. As per the above discussion, an
evidence development scheme should unambiguously reduce
parameter uncertainty: therefore, improving the precision of
parameter estimates is indicative of success. Process indicators
of success of the scheme should relate to the ﬁrst three research
questions, including the following:expected INMB is less than the prior estimate), the
decision uncertainty has increased to 28%. In the case
illustrated, the EVPI after the PBRSA is approximately Were the intended outcome measures collected?
50% greater than that which existed before the PBRSA. It
should be noted, however, that the EVPI is calculated asWas uncertainty in associated parameter estimation reduced
for the outcomes that were the focus of the scheme?the integration of the probability of an incorrect decision Did the scheme run to budget and time?
and the consequences (INMB loss) associated with that Was the integrity of the design/estimation maintained?
decision. In other words, while decision uncertainty Did the governance arrangements work well?
looks at the probability of a wrong decision, the EVPI
calculation weights that probability by the consequent
loss. Thus, although Figure 2 illustrates a scenario in
which there is an increase in both decision uncertainty
and in EVPI after the PBRSA, it is possible to show
examples in which decision uncertainty increases but
the EVPI nevertheless decreases (because most wrong
decisions lead to small losses) and vice versa.Did the process to underpin a decision with further evidence
prove successful?
The last point is very important. Ultimately, of course, to meet
the objectives of a CED scheme, it is necessary to show that the
decision making following the reporting of the scheme was
informed by the additional evidence. Where an OWR scheme
was implemented with a further review, it will be necessary to
demonstrate that the appropriate decision was made in light of
the evidence generated: this could be a “no change” decision
where appropriate, or a reversal of previous recommendations, or
in the case of a price negotiation, that the price was adjusted.
Where an OIR scheme was implemented, the question is did the
generation of additional evidence lead to a conﬁdent recommen-
dation (either positive or negative) for the whole patient group
following the completion of the scheme? Where a performance-
linked reimbursement scheme is being run, appropriate decision
making will require the ability to show that the agreed outcome
adjustments were made to improve the cost-effectiveness of the
intervention.Evaluation Experience
Evidence on PBRSAs to date is limited: Puig-Peiró et al. [41] conducted a systematic literature review to
identify existing knowledge about the costs and beneﬁts,
assessed either quantitatively or qualitatively, of PBRSAs. They
found that more than 40% of the publications referred to the UK
MS RSS, and no studies were able to evaluate the overall
economic impact of a PBRSA. All studies only included
Box 6–The Netherlands
What entities are involved in the process?
In 2006, in The Netherlands, a coverage with evidence
development (CED) policy was introduced for expensive
medicines (i.e., total expenses for the drug account for
0.5% of the nationwide hospital expenses on medicines,
which means 2.5 million euros) and orphan drugs.
Organizations (viz., industry or associations of health
care professionals) could formally submit a request for
the inclusion of a medicine in the policy regulation to
the Dutch Healthcare Authority (Nederlandse Zorgau-
toriteit [NZa]). The NZa asked the Healthcare Insurance
Board (College voor zorgverzekeringen [CVZ]) for advice
on the inclusion of a medicine in the policy regulations.
CVZ based its advice to the Ministry of Health, Welfare,
and Sport (Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Spor [VWS]) on
an assessment of the medicine by the Medicinal
Products Reimbursement Committee (College Farm-
aceutische Hulp [CFH]) (from 2013 Wetenschappelijke
Adviesraad [WAR]) and/or the Insured Package Advisory
Committee (Adviescommissie Pakket [ACP]). CVZ as-
sessed the “therapeutic value” of the new drug in
comparison with the standard or usual treatment
(either medicinal or nonmedicinal in nature) for a given
indication in The Netherlands.
What is the general approach and experience in The
Netherlands?
Determination of therapeutic value is based on efficacy,
cost-effectiveness, side-effect profile, experience, applic-
ability, and ease of use. In addition, the CVZ assessed the
applicant’s first estimate of potential cost-effectiveness
together with a study proposal for the collection of real-
world data for the reassessment of effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, and efficient use. If the drug is included
under the policy, this study proposal with suggestions
Fig. 2 – Parameter and decision uncertainty prior to a PBRSA
(A) and after the scheme reports (B). PBRSA, performance-
based risk-sharing arrangement.
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of the UK MS RSS in which some costs estimates were reported.from the CVZ provides the starting point for the outcomes
research. Manufacturers, providers, and health care in-
stitutions had to ensure jointly that sufficient data would
be collected within 3 years for reassessing outcomes;
however, the evaluation period was changed to 4 years,
after 3 years was found to be too short.
By the end of 2011, 26 expensive drugs for 34In the case of the UK MS RSS, the results of the scheme are
discussed in Box 1. Issues were raised as to the design of the
study and the time delays in generating the evidence, the
enforceability of the contract in relation to the link between
prices and outcomes, and problems in the governance of the
scheme [61]. indications were on the positive list of this policy
regulation, as well as 10 orphan drugs. By that time,
five drugs had reached the reassessment phase after 4Neumann et al. [62] reviewed ﬁve PBRSAs in the United States
and the United Kingdom and concluded that they are hard to
implement in practice.years. For two of these, no reassessment dossier was
submitted to the CVZ, and subsequently these drugs
were taken off the positive list and the additional
funding for these drugs within hospitals was stopped.The Italian PBRSA utilization schemes appear to have been
well received. This may reﬂect in part use of a national
electronic patient registration system reducing transaction
costs (see Box 4).For the other three drugs, the dossiers were submitted to
the CVZ in 2011, presenting the effectiveness, cost-
effectiveness, and actual use based on 4-year findings.PBRSA experience in The Netherlands to date suggests that in
some cases the quality of evidence collected has been poor
(see Box 6).None of the dossiers presenting real-world effective-
ness, cost-effectiveness, and actual use was considered
to be of adequate quality. These findings were presented
to the ACP committee (part of the CVZ), which assessed
the societal aspects of the interventions. To date, the
CVZ has advised positively on only one of these productsThe experience of CED in the United States is covered in Box 2.
The main form has no explicit agreement between the
manufacturer and the payer, but an implicit assumption that
the data will be used for future coverage decisions. Difﬁculties
have emerged around study ﬁnancing and design, but most
importantly around decision making with further evidence.to the VWS, more specifically, a performance-linked scheme for omalizumab (Xolair) under which the drug
would be reimbursed only if the effectiveness for an
individual patient was demonstrated after a fixed
period. Omalizumab is indicated for patients having
severe persistent asthma. Because of the relatively high
price, the cost-effectiveness was considered unfavor-
able. Based on an initiative of the manufacturer
(Novartis), the Dutch society for pulmonologists (Neder-
landse Vereniging van Artsen voor Longziekten enThe available evidence on another non-US CED OWR scheme
—bosentan (Tracleer) scheme in Australia—suggests that it
was successful. Patients were enrolled in a registry. The
results suggested that some reduction in price was appropri-
ate. A competing product was listed at a 15% price discount,
and the sponsor agreed to a government request for the same
discount [63]. It is clear, however, that the interpretation of
the results was much complicated than anticipated, leading to
a range of possible price reductions [63].
Tuberculose [NVALT]), and the Longfonds (Lung Fund)
representing patients, the VWS and the CVZ agreed to
an arrangement where the manufacturer would reim-
burse the drug acquisition costs in cases in which a
patient does not respond to omalizumab. This is defined
in a general agreement, and the manufacturer will sign
individual contracts with the separate hospitals. This
scheme will be evaluated after 2 years.
Examples of PBRSAs in The Netherlands
The first two drugs to be included (December 2006) on
the positive list of the policy regulation were infliximab
(Remicade) for the indication of psoriasis and alemtu-
zumab (Mabcampath) for advanced chronic lymphocytic
leukemia (CLL). In 2008, alemtuzumab was again put on
the positive list for the indication of first- and second-
line treatment of CLL. This example demonstrates that
the reimbursement decision for drugs in The Nether-
lands is related to specific indications and that the same
drug can be assessed for inclusion in the expensive
medicines policy several times. Also, for example,
rituximab (Mabthera) is on the list for rheumatoid
arthritis, non-Hodgkins lymphoma, and CLL.
Recently, ranibizumab (Lucentis) for the treatment of
neovascular age-related macular degeneration was re-
assessed by the CVZ. It was proposed to the VWS to
exclude ranibizumab from reimbursement beginning
2015 unless additional evidence shows that patients
who do not respond or are contraindicated for off-label
use of bevacizimab (Avastin) have a clinical benefit
compared with current treatment options. To date, the
ministry has not indicated whether it will follow this
advice of the CVZ.
New 2012 Regulation
Beginning in 2012, the policy for expensive medicines
and orphan drugs was terminated and replaced by a CED
scheme for all health care technologies that fall within
the reimbursement package (called “voorwaardelijke
toelating”). Previously, CED for expensive drugs was
intended to supplement the hospital budget. From 2012
on, CED is meant to cover interventions that are not yet
part of the basic package due to lack of evidence on
effectiveness. Conditional reimbursement explicitly
aims to gather evidence on effectiveness. Based on this
regulation, a restricted number of technologies can be
temporarily included in the national reimbursement
package for a period of 4 years. A restriction on numbers
is considered necessary because the budgets and
research capacity to gather the required evidence are
both limited. Besides temporary inclusion in the reim-
bursement package, drugs can be temporarily funded
(while excluded from the package) on the basis of a
positive treatment effect without substantial evidence
on cost-effectiveness and appropriate use. The criteria
for choosing specific technologies for the Dutch CED
system are mainly based on: the definition of the
essential evidence gap; the specific research question
and quality of a detailed research protocol; the feasi-
bility to collect relevant evidence during the 4-year
period; and the balance of the value of the evidence in
relation to the research budget needed. VWS decides
which interventions will be temporarily reimbursed,
depending on the available research budget.
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which has had numerous conﬁdential price-volume “man-
aged entry” agreements with volume based on expected cost-effective utilization. At least four PBRSAs have been imple-
mented in Australia: only bosentan has been reviewed in the
published literature. In several other Asia-Paciﬁc countries—
notably, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—a few condi-
tional treatment continuation PBRSAs have been initiated and
others are under active consideration but there is no evalua-
tion evidence [64]. Although the UK PASs include discount arrangements as well
as PBRSA performance-linked reimbursement and CED OWR
schemes, the experience is relevant. Williamson [15] reports
on a survey of oncology pharmacists in National Health
Service hospitals. Transaction costs for the National Health
Service were the biggest concern. However, in contrast, a
review by the Department of Health focused on the additional
numbers of patients receiving access to drugs deemed cost-
effective by the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (after including transaction costs) [16]. Sweden has implemented 17 PBRSAs, of which 16 were CED,
though no formal evaluations have been published [1]. The results from other European Union countries are unclear,
and the schemes are in evolution [14,65–68]. In a recent survey
of oncology schemes in Europe, six European countries were
found to be using either ﬁnancially based schemes or outcome-
based schemes, though most were ﬁnancially based. But coun-
tries were found to vary in how they implement them. Opinions
on arguments for and limitations of such schemes were sur-
veyed, but there was no formal evaluation [68].
Overall, the literature suggests that there is an important gap
in structured ex post evaluations of PBRSAs. Performance-linked
reimbursement schemes appear to have been more successful to
date than CED schemes. The evidence, however, is limited,
mixed, qualitative, and partial.Conclusions
This task force report has reviewed the issues associated with
deﬁning good research and operational practices for PBRSAs.
Previous analysts, commentators, and task forces have identiﬁed,
discussed, and addressed many of these issues. Previous ISPOR
methods task forces and other professional organizations have
deﬁned GRPs for the main relevant study designs.
Our intention is to move the discussion forward by deﬁning
the scope of the problem and identifying the issues with greater
clarity. The major messages of this report are as follows: PBRSAs are an understandable and logical response to
increasing pressure for greater evidence of real-world effec-
tiveness and long-term cost-effectiveness for new medicines
and other health technologies in the early stage of adoption
and diffusion. In some cases, PBRSAs use performance-linked reimburse-
ment at the patient level, tracking what happens to each
patient. In contrast, the other major type of PBRSA is research
based and uses CED with research, either alongside product
use (i.e., “OWR”) or product use only in the context of research
(i.e., “OIR”). PBRSAs using CED can use observational studies or RCTs in
either an OWR setting or an OIR setting. Where an RCT is
preferred but may not be feasible with OWR, evidence can be
collected from an RCT in another jurisdiction, provided the
results can be translated into the setting of interest for
stakeholders. All PBRSAs, including those tracking patients in performance-
linked reimbursement schemes, can provide valuable evi-
dence that is potentially a global public good. The value of
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followed in research design, implementation, and evaluation. Additional evidence collection is costly. It is critical that it is
designed to address the main uncertainties that are making
payers reluctant to reimburse or recommend the use of the
product. GRP requires matching the appropriate study design
to these uncertainties. There are numerous barriers to establishing viable and cost-
effective PBRSAs: negotiation, monitoring, and evaluation
costs can be substantial. PBRSAs should include a prespeciﬁed
deliberative process setting out when and how future deci-
sions are to be tied to the additional evidence that is
developed. Good governance processes are also essential. Because they can generate evidence that is a public good,
PBRSAs are likely to be underutilized. This tendency can be
countered if public payers assume some greater responsibility
for the greater (global) societal welfare and private payers and
manufacturers are constrained or incentivized to use these
agreements when appropriate. The societal desirability of speciﬁc PBRSA is fundamentally a
VOI question, comparing the societal costs of additional data
collection with the societal beneﬁts of improved resource
allocation decisions. However, the evaluation of the success
of a PBRSA should be a multidimensional exercise that tracks
not only whether uncertainty about expected effectiveness is
reduced but also the quality of the research process and
evidence generated. It must look at the impact on decision
uncertainty and whether there was an effective process to
support decision making with additional evidence. There is an important gap in the literature of structured ex
post evaluation of PBRSAs. Performance-linked reimburse-
ment schemes appear to have been more successful than
CED schemes. The evidence, however, is limited, mixed,
qualitative, and partial. The ability to run successful PBRSA schemes using either
performance-linked reimbursement or CED will provide an
important additional tool for increasing efﬁciency in health care.
Robust evaluation of such schemes will be important for learning. As an innovation in and of themselves, PBRSAs should
ultimately be evaluated from a long-run societal perspective
in terms of their impact on dynamic efﬁciency (eliciting the
optimal amount of innovation).Acknowledgments
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